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CHAPTER I

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN PEOPLE AND LITERARY CHARACTERS
Most often we think of characters in books as
though they were people.

It's easy to do.

Don't we

laugh at Falstaff and cry for Katrina Ivanovna?

Don't

we feel we know them well, often better than we feel we
know our friends?

But this feeling we have that charac-

ters are people cannot be transferred to criticism.
instance,

For

if I decide that Hamlet is person enough to be

like my brother, I

have not communicated anything about

the Hamlet who is the character in the play Hamlet.
would not want to say:

"I read Hamlet;

brother;" but I might say:
like my brother."

I

it is about my

"I read Hamlet; and Hamlet is

I might say this, but it is not

criticism, because it doesn't communicate critically anything about the character Hamlet.

If I were to go

another step and say that Hamlet is like my brother in
that Hamlet puns a lot and so does my brother, and then
drop out the part about the brother to say,
a lot," I move into criticism.

"Hamlet puns

The part about Hamlet

being person enough to be like my brother is irrelevant
to criticism, but it was useful in the process of
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arriving at criticism.

The impulse that makes us

connect characters in books with various kinds of
people in our lives should not be confused with criticism about character.

The words on the page are not

people; those words on the page are characters, and they
resemble people no more than the alphabetical characters

£

1

~'

and

~

"resemble" a familiar pet.

George Wright's theory of character in The Poet and
the Poem seems to work well when discussing character.

He

suggests that "characters in literature have no extension
beyond the limits of the work in which they appear; they
have, on the other hand,

a kind of extendibility, a sym-

bolic dimension that the matter-of-fact persons of our
acquaintance do not have." 1
accepted,

If the first part of this is

it might be possible to say that a character is

a collection of words divided into two parts:
that can be called the body collection

the part

(actions, so-

called, fit into this collection); and the part that can
be called the mind collection
here).

(thoughts, so-called, fit

These collections of words, when read and formed

into a pattern by the reader,
reader's mind.

create an image in the

But it is a little misleading to suggest

that collections of words must be read in order to
create an image.
read,

Whenever even one character word is

an image is created.

always mean "picture."

"Image," here, does not

If we are honest and look at
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the words that delimit character, we find that there
are not enough words on the page to make a picture in
our minds.

But, as Arnold Bennett has noticed,

"the

honest written word possesses a mysterious and intimidating power.
sight.

This power has to do with the sense of

You see something.

You do not see your action

or your thought as it might be on the cinema screen -happily! -- but you do see something in regard to the
matter." 2

This "something" might be called an image,

which Ezra Pound has defined as "an intellectual and
emotional complex in an instant of time."3
This image can be extended into verbal life, can be
extended, that is, not to people, but to what we are
willing to say about people.

Of the various collections

of words that are in a book, syntactical characters are
those collections of words that can be distinguished
from other groups of words in perhaps two ways:

the

first is that characters are groups of words we are
willing to say are people, or are willing, at least, to
say are like people once we have formed an image; the
second distinction is that characters couldn't possibly
refer to anyone outside the book.
Of course, as William Gass has noted in "The Concept
of Character in Fiction," "anything, indeed, which serves
as a fixed point,

like a stone in a stream or that soap in

Bloom's pocket, functions as a character," 4 but in this

4
paper only those fixed points around which the language
of a work flows,

those fixed points a reader would

identify with "people" will be considered characters.
Much criticism of character is based on some form of
this first assumption about character, the assumption that
characters are words we would identify with people.

But,

unfortunately, the criticism sometimes confuses this
identification with what a character is.

Since there is

a lot of criticism based on this assumption, i t might be
helpful when surveying it to classify it according to
M. H. Abrams'

schema for classifying general criticism.

Criticism of character can fit into Abrams'

four cate-

gories -- the mimetic, which is the relationship between
the work of art and life; the expressive, which is the
relationship between the work and the artist; the pragmatic, which is the relationship between the work and the
audience;

and the objective, which is the work itself.

5

In the criticism of character, the mimetic does not remain
a category in itself; it divides into two parts and then
falls into either the expressive or the pragmatic categories.
If it can be assumed that a character is a collection
of words and the image that results from reading those
words, we can say that "character" differs from a person
in that a character is not expected to appear physically
from behind this curtain of words; a character is not the

5
object of perception that a person can be.
criticism, like that of E.

M.

Yet mimetic

Forster, assumes that

characters are people in books who were once people in
life.

What,

then,

is the relationship between people

in a novel and people in an historical tract?

Forster

says that "there is bound to be a difference" between the
two:
If a character in a novel is like Queen
Victoria -- not rather like but exactly like -then it actually is Queen Victoria, and the
novel, or all of it that the character touches,
becomes a memoir.
A memoir is history, it is
based on evidence.
A novel is based on evidence
+ or - x, the unknown quantity being the temperament of the novelist, and the unknown quantity
always modifies the effect of the evidence, and
6
sometimes transforms it entirely.
Forster seems to get carried away when he suggests that
the character "actually is Queen Victoria," because if
we were to accept that, words would be life, or, at
least, we'd be constantly giving birth,
Anthenas out of our minds.

like Zeus,

to

Surely he doesn't mean this.

He means instead something like:

there was a real Queen

Victoria who was observed, and certain observations, among
a multitude of possible ones,

and only those certain

observations, were written down.

And so we know we have

picked up a book of memoirs.
What is Forster's corresponding assumption about
novels?

He assumes that there was a real Elizabeth Bennett,

say, who existed and was observed prior to the creation of

6
Middlemarch, and these felt observations
of the artist") were written down,

("temperament

felt observations

which alter the affect of the original Elizabeth Bennett
almost, often, to the point of completely changing the
observations, and these, which we might call "observations," are written down.

If we assume that there was a

real Elizabeth Bennett, Middlemarch becomes not a record
of the real Elizabeth Bennett,

for that would make

Middlemarch a memoir, but a record of the emotions of the
novelist, or, as Castelvetro says,

"the strife of the poet."

This is a seemingly mimetic view of the novel that is
actually an expressive view, a romantic view.
Critically, we don't know very much about character
if we use Forster's thinking.

Does it inform the character

Hamlet to say that Hamlet is how Shakespeare felt about
some real Hamlet?

Not any more than discovering Hamlet

is like one's brother helped us critically.

Forster

didn't take his criticism quite far enough.

He begins

with the assumption that characters are people in books
and ends his discussion on a point that doesn't inform
us about character;

it informs us about novelists.

It would seem that if an expressive view isn't
critically useful, an objective view might be, because an
objective view concentrates on the book itself, on the
book we read.

It is on the objective level that character

is a collection of words.

Perhaps an analysis of a passage
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from Middlemarch would be useful here:
Caleb pushed his spectacles upward, listened,
looked into his f1vorite's clear young eyes,
and believed him.
Caleb is a grammatical character in a book, a group of
words grammatically bound to a proper name.

Caleb is

"pushed," "his spectacles," "listened, looked,"
"believed," and "Caleb."

The grammatical character

"Caleb" is not yet someone who wears glasses.
image is formed from these words,

As the

the notion of "live

person" is added to them, because "Caleb" is the sort
of name a person would have, and because the verbs and
nouns that cluster around "Caleb" are the kinds of verbs
and nouns that would be associated with a live person.
And so caleb becomes "someone" who wears glasses.

So

the associations go on, but at the simple level of
words on the page, there is no person.
William Gass assumes that this simple level, words
on a page,
schema,
(3)

is the only "reality" of character.

"Caleb" would be "(1) a noise,

a complex system of ideas,

tion,

(5)

a proper name,

a controlling concep-

an instrument of verbal organization,

pretended mode of referring,
energy."

(4)

(2)

and

In Gass's

(7)

(6)

a

a source of verbal

8

Of course, this is not the alive-seeming Caleb

8

Garth we talk about when we discuss Middlemarch, because
we don't have the image yet; but, for us as readers,
Garth begins as words in a book.
these words,

Caleb

He begins as words,

and

which become patterned, or are realized to be

"a complex system of ideas," become almost simultaneously
a mental image.

We need this image to account for our

sense that Caleb lives.

Although Gass can account for

part of a reader's experience with character, his criticism falls short of a full sense of that experience
because he calls character "a pretended mode of referring,"
instead of noting that character, as words on a page,
give rise to an image, an image that we can critically
refer to.
Pragmatic criticism, because it is concerned with the
relationship between the work of art and an audience,
would seem a likely place to find the missing part of our
experience with character, but, curiously, pragmatic criticism seems to be another form of mimetic criticism that
fails to give us a full sense of character.

Sir Philip

Sidney, one of the teach-and-delight critics, a pragmatic
critic therefore,

says that poetry is made "tc imitate,

and imitate both to delight and teach, and delight to move
men to take that goodness in hand, which without delight
they would flie as from a stranger ... :

9

Even though Sidney

means the poet to imitate not people but "notable images
of virtues, vices,

or what els,"

10

characters still become

9

speaking pictures, pictures not of men, but of vices:
"wisdom and temperance in Ulysses and Diomedes, valure
in Achilles,

friendship in Nisus and Eurialus."

11

The

reader is to be delighted by the pictures of embodied
virtues and vices that appear in the book.

Sidney under-

stands that there are images associated with reading, but
he puts the images in the wrong place.

The role of the

reader is more active than Sidney supposes.

The reader

does not read an already-put-together picture book;
the reader reads words, and if there are images,

the

reader must make them from those words.
It seems, then, that the question of the relationship
between characters in a book and people in life is still an
open question critically.

Further,

it seems that any

answer to the question must consider the three experiences
we have with character,

the two experiences of the words on

the page and the experience of those words somehow coming
alive.
In this connection Wright's observation about character is particularly useful,

and this paper owes much of its

thought and organization to the implications of that observation.

The second chapter of.this paper will be based

mainly on Wright's contention that "characters in literature
have no extension beyond the limits of the work in which
they appear."

The second chapter,

then is concerned mainly

with objective criticism that finds that on the simple level
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of words in a book, there are two of the three parts of
our experience with character.

The first part is the

syntactical character, which is the occurrence on the
printed page of character words, character words as they
appearone after another as the book is read.
part is the spatial character,

The second

the recognition by the

reader that the name we have seen several times, with
its accompanying noun and verb clusters, is about the
same thingi spatial character is what Gass might be calling an "instrument of verbal organization."

The spatial

character relies at least partially on the image for its
organization.
Also in the second chapter, between objective criticism and Wright's "symbolic dimension," is the image,

the

"emotional and intellectual complex," which is the "something" we get in our minds at the first sight of a
character word and which moves and changes with each
additional character word as the reader patterns the syntactical character.

The image is fluid, because it depends

both on the words read in the past and on the words that
are being read, but it is in no sense symbolic of the words
being read, nor is it a translation into a picture of what
is being read.

It is a "something" that the grammatical

character gives rise to.

In the second chapter, then,

character is defined as these three elements -- syntactical
character, spatial character, and image.
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The third chapter of this paper will discuss Wright's
notion that characters in literature "have ... a kind of
extendability, a symbolic dimension that the matter-offact persons of our acquaintance do not have."

The third

chapter assumes that there is no relationship between
people and characters in a book; rather,
is between the grammatical character,

the relationship

the image, and what

a reader is willing to say about people.
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. CHAPTER II

THREE ELEMENTS OF CHARACTER

Character in prose and in poetry is a process that
includes three separate elements, and, as a critical term,
"character" means all three:

(1)

the words that delimit

character in the order in which they occur on the printed
page;

(2)

these printed words organized in the reader's mind

to be a verbal pattern on the syntactical level;

(3)

a men-

tal image that results from reading the printed words.

The

image is not memorized printed words, nor is it just a
picture.
The first two elements,

as I state in the first chap-

ter, are suggested by Wright's claim that "characters in
literature have no extension beyond the work in which they
appear," and they refer as well to Northrop Frye's definition of the literal level of literature:

"the literal

basis of meaning ... can only be its letters,
structure of interlocking motifs." 1

its inner

Frye's "meaning of its

letters" corresponds to the first element, "the words of
character as they appear on the prirted page."
element will be called syntactical character.

This first
The "inner

structure of interlocking motifs," mentioned by Frye as
part of his definition of "literal," corresponds to the
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second element, the printed words of character ordered
into a pattern.

This second element will be called the

spatial character.

These two phaseA of character together

will be called the grammatical character.
The third element, the image,

is extraliteral, mean-

ing not that character comes mysteriously from the air, nor
that character resides in the world, but that the image
comes mysteriously from the printed words;

it is not,

how-

ever like the words it comes from, nor is it the words
themselves.

Images haunt our minds as the thing which the

grammatical character gives rise to. 2
On the syntactic level, one of the most obvious facts
about character is the name, a name that is a
word.

no~ense

There will not be strong support for calling names

like "Artegall," "Dorothea Brooke," or "Odysseus" nonsense
words, but on the syntactic level they are, because all that
can be said about them, as William Gass has said, is that
they are either noises or proper names.
A discussion of a passage from The Faerie Queene might
help us here.
Dread Soverayne Goddesse, that doest highest sit
In seate of judgement in th' Almighties stead,
And with magnificke might and wondrous wit
Doest to thy people righteous doome aread,
That furthest Nations filles with awful dread,
Pardon the boldnesse of thy basest thrall,
That dare discourse of so divine a read
As they great justice, praysed over-all,
3
The instrument whereof loe! here they Artegall.
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Here "Artegall" is simply a noise, a proper name,

if we are

reading on the level of the syntactic character.

We are not

concerned with the truth of the word,
world.

its reference to the

Spenser did not need an Artegall to write "Artegall"

any more than Lewis Carroll needed a vorpal sword in order
to write "vorpal sword."

Nor do we, as we read, need a real

Artegall or a real vorpal sword in order to understand these
words.

Syntax itself will allow us to create words that

have only literal meaning, which means that the "words cannot be separated and attached to sign-values:

all possible

sign values of a word are absorbed into a complexity of
verbal relationships."4

In this understanding of the liter-

al level of the poem, Frye is talking about the meaning of
a whole poem, so the notion of literal meaning he uses might
be applied to only some words of a poem, say, to the names
and noun and verb phrases that are syntactic character.
"Soverayne Goddesse," for instance, is the name of a character, a name that has possible sign value, but the sign values
have been absorbed into the poem.

There is only one word in

the passage from The Faerie Queene that is a nonsense word,
a word that has no possible sign value.
gall."

On the literal level,

That word is "Arte-

then, Artegall is where the

name is.
It is from a realization like this that William Gass
has said that "words are opaque, as opaque as my garden
gloves and trowel, objects which, nevertheless, may vividly
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remind me of spring, earth, and roses."5

Gass, here, is

talking about what can be called literal meaning.

But such

a view as his seems to take a purely syntactic analysis
too far to be true of our perception of character.
Although literally a character is only where the name and
the nouns and verbs of it are, we don't want to say that
these words are opaque, because we have yet to get an image
from them.

To continue Gass•s metaphor,

if we say these

words are opaque to us as readers, we have also said that
the trowel is opaque to us when we have gardening to do.
And, of course, we don't want to say that because just as
the trowel is a tool for gardening,
images.

so are words tools for

The words of character on the literal level are

opaque to Gass because character words are opaque to the
world.

But syntactical character is not opaque to us as

readers the way vorpal sword is.
It is the realization that these words are not
opaque to us as readers that creates the need critically
for both the spatial character and the image.
character, as a pattern of character words,

The spatial

is what defines

syntactical character as a character for us rather than as
simply unassociated words.

The image is the mental thing

that the grammatical character gives rise to; the image is,
therefore, on the mental side of the grammatical character.
In the passage from The Faerie Queene, for example,

"Arte-

gall" means spatially "the instrument of thy justice."
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Syntactically, the word ''Artegall" means "Arthur's equal,"
and because "Artegall" is capitalized, we know that it is
a proper name.

But these grammatical and etymological

meanings are not always what we mean critically when we
discuss Artegall.

There is a spatial meaning that seems

closer to our notions of character than does "Arthur's
equal."

What we would probably say critically is that

"Arthur's equal" is the meaning of a character's name;
we would not finally say that the name or its meaning is
the character, but syntactically it is.
I know that a while back I said that syntactically,
the words of character are nonsense.

This meant that

character words do not refer to the world;

it also meant

that syntactical character does not make sense as character until we put it all together,
character.

until we create spatial

A regular reading of syntax was all that was

necessary for us to understand that "Artegall" means not
only "Arthur's equal," but that it means "instrument of
thy justice" as well.

With the addition,

notion of spatial character,

then, of the

"Artegall" not only gets

character meaning, but the words "instrument of thy justice," words which might have possible sign value,get
subsumed into the literal level of the text,

and,

for the

first time, critically, we have grammatical character,
our first sense of full character.
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Not all verbal patterns that we would call character
center themselves on names, but the same process is always
involved.

Shakespeare's sonnets seem a likely place to

find grammatical characters without names:
My Mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun,
Coral is far more red than her lips' red.
If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun,
If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head.
I have seen roses damasked, red and white,
But no such roses see I in her cheeks.
And in some perfumes is there more delight
Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks.
I love to hear her speak, yet well I know
That music hath a far more pleasing sound.
I grant I never saw a goddess go,
My mistress, when she walks, treads on the ground.
And yet, by heaven, I think my love ag rare
As any she belied with false compare.
Syntactically, there are two characters here,

"Mistress'

eyes are nothing like the sun,/Coral is far more red
than her lips'

red./If snows be white," etc., which, when

they are sorted out syntactically, become the two
characters "Mistress" and "I."
"mistress" means

7

The grammatical character

spatially "eyes are nothing like the

sun," "Coral is far more red than her lips' red," "her
breasts are dun," "black wires grow on her head," "her
cheeks," "And in some perfumes is there more delight/Than
in the breath that from my mistress reeks," "her speak,"
"mistress," "she walks, treads on the ground," "love as
rare/As any she belied with false compare."

The grammati-

cal character "I" means "my," "I have seen," "see I,"
"my," "I love to hear," "well I know/That music hath a
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more pleasing sound," "I grant I never saw," "my,"
"I think."
It is customary to think that "I" means William
Shakespeare.

Perhaps, but it doesn't add very much

critically to think that after each "I" there is a
parenthetical William Shakespeare.

Syntactically,

"I"

is simply a first person pronoun that governs the choice
of the verb;

it also means that the speaker of a sentence

and the doer of it are the same.

But, of course, this

sense of "I" seems cold.
Wright speaks well to our sense that "I" is somehow
alive and sacred.
There are always two levels of speech in a work
of literature -- that on which the characters
speak to each other, to themselves, to an implied
audience, or to God, and that on which the writer
speaks to us.
In the lyric poem more than in any
other genre these levels tend to become confused.
We can sense rather easily the presence of the two
levels in a fairly formal lyric, say a love sonnet.
On the surface we can read the following personae:
1st person:
singer of love song
2nd person:
singer's mistress
8
3rd person:
singer's love for mistress.
The first two persons are the "I" and the "mistress" of
Shakespeare's sonnet.

The third person is not "in"

the words of the poem;

it is associated with the image as

can be seen in Wrights's second level of speech:

20

1st person:
2nd person:
3rd person:

composer of song
we as readers or hearers
human passion, one aspect of the
human world.9

This third person is clearly different from the 2nd
person because human passion is larger than any one person's private notion of it,
than any "I" of a poem.

just as the poet is larger

Wright says that when a poet

tries to give us his world view, a view requiring for
its full formulation those "particular events, situations,
emotions, and tones," he could never express it "by an
'I' within the poem.
larger than any

'I'

The poet's point of view is always
for the

materials of the poem,

'I,'

like the other surface

is only a conventional element."

It is possible, then,

to consider the 'I' of a poem

as separate from the writer of the poem.

Of course,

Wright's contention that the poet's point of view is
always larger than any

'I' of the poem,

falls out of our

view of this paper since it deals with the relationship
between artist and work,

and this paper deals with the

relationship between work and audience.

But it is possible

to replace Wright's first person with the syntactical
aspects of the poem -- its rhyme,
and so on.

its rhythm,

We could then say that the

its sounds,

'I' of any poem,

or maybe any character of a poem, is only one part of a
poem; the poem is always larger than any character.

or,

to play on Aristotle, you can always have a poem without a
character, but you cannot have a character without a poem.
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Our sense that "I" is somehow alive and sacred
comes, then,

from the third person,

"human passion, one

aspect of the human world," and the sense of human
passion resides in the second person, the readers or
hearers.

But this anticipates the third chapter and

so will wait until then.
The "I," of Sonnet 130 can be spoken of as separate
from William Shakespeare and can be said to take its
meaning as a character,
spatial character,

rather than as a word,

from the

so that as a spatial character "I"

both is and means "My," "I have seen," and all those other
phrases that were listed before.
Throughout this discussion of grammatical character,
phrases have been used that imply the presence of the
image.

When I

said that the "I" of Sonnet 130 gets its

meaning from syntax,

the grammatical character "I" was

certainly being pointed at, but so was the image.

Perhaps

critically the image can best be seen when it replaces
the grammatical character in criticism.

Percy Lubbock,

in a brilliant discussion of why Emma Bovary is in
Madame Bovary,

replaces the grammatical character with

its image:
Here is the clue, it seems, to his treatment
of the theme.
It is pictorial, and its object
is to make Emma's existence as intelligible and
visible as may be.
We who read the book are to
share her sense of life ... ~he fact of Emma is
taken with entire seriousness of course; she
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is there to be studied and explored, and no means
of understanding her point of view will be
neglected.lO
~en

Lubbock says "the fact of Emma," and not "the fact

of 'Emma'," and when he talks about the visible sense of
the book, he is replacing grammatical character with the
image.
When we say that Red Crosse Knight killed the dragon
Error instead of quoting the passage, we are usually
referring to the image and not to the grammatical character
"Red Crosse Knight."

What is the image?

Unfortunately, a critic cannot point to the images
and say,

"there they are";

experience.

one must simply appeal to one's

I've said before that the image could best be

understood as "an intellectual and emotional complex
presented in an instant of time," and that the image is
11
not the words themselves; it is a sort of Gestalt.
Before discussing the obvious complication that we
often understand "image" only as though it translates
"picture," we might examine how the grammatical character
is perceived by the reader;

for,

it is in the perception

of the grammatical character that the image first arises.
In order to facilitate the later discussion of mental
pictures, it may be helpful to look at Sonnet 130 again,
since it would be difficult to get a picture of either of
the two characters in that poem.
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It was noticed before that there are two grammatical
characters in Sonnet 130,

the "I" and the "mistress," and

all the phrases that cluster around either word.

"Syntacti-

cal character" is the phrases as they occur in the order in
which we read them.
patterned.

Spatial character is these phrases

If we look again at the first six lines of

the sonnet, we can see that there are at least two ways to
explain how the reader patterns the syntactical character.
My mistress' eyes
Coral is far more
If snow be white,
If hairs be wires,
I have seen roses
But no such roses

are nothing like the sun,
red than her lips' red.
why then her breasts are dun,
black wires grow on her head.
damasked, red and white,
see I in her cheeks.

By the time we have read "My Mistress'" we have two syntactical characters.

Then, at the end of the second line,

we read "her lips'

red," and we link together "Mistress'"

and "her lips," thereby creating the beginning of a grammatical character centered around "Mistress'."
at least two ways of talking about this linki

There are
"her" refers

syntactically to "Mistress'," and we can say that there is
a link by image;
grammatical link,
same thing.

we recognize, probably because of the
that "Mistress'" and "her" are about the

This "thing" is the image.

We began creating

the image at the same time that we read the word "Mistress'."

There might be a confusion here.

talking about understanding the words,
Wittgenstein has remarked,

for,

I am not
as Ludwig

"it is no more essential to
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the understanding of a proposition that one should imagine
anything in connection with it,
a sketch

fro~ it~ 12

than that one should make

We understand the syntactical characters

"Mistress'" and "I," and we understand these words as they
take on literal meanings from spatial character; we don't
need the image,

in the sense of a picture,

an analogy or

a "something" in order to understand.
The image exists, however,

and is used in criticism.

In this sense Wittgenstein is again useful.
Instead of "imaginability" one can also say
here:
representability by a particular
method of representation.
And such a representation may indeed safely point a way to
further use of a sentence.
On the other
hand a picture may obtrude itself upon us
and be of no use at all.l3
The clause here that is particularly useful is "And such
a representation may indeed safely point a way to further
use of a sentence."

We use our images in criticism, and

criticism is a further use of a passage.

Perhaps if we

look at a passage from Madame Bovary and then look again at
Lubbock's discussion of Emma, we can see that the image is
not necessarily a picture, but that the image is used
critically.
Once she was standing there on a day of thaw,
when the bark of the trees in the farmyard was
oozing sap and the snow was melting on the roofs.
She went inside for her parasol, and opened it.
The parasol was of rosy iridescent silk, and the
sun pouring through it painted the white skin of
her face with flickering patches of light.
Beneath it she smiled at the springlike warmth;
and drops of water could be heard falling one by
one on the taut moire.l4
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If this passage gives rise to a picture in our minds,
presumably we see a woman, because of "she," with a whiteskinned face and a smile, with no body, holding, without
hands, a rosy-red parasol.

William Gass, when he is dis-

cussing Mr. Cashmore in The Awkward Age,

suggests that

as "a set of sensations Mr. Cashmore is simply

impossible~

as an idea he is admirably pungent and precise."l5
same thing can be said of Emma

Bovary~

The

as a grammatical

character she is "mostly empty canvas," but as an image
she is a wonderful idea.
When Lubbock said "the fact of Emma," he wasn't
talking about the grammatical character nor was he really
talking about a picture in our minds.

Why,

then, does it

make so much sense when he says "it is pictorial, and its
object is to make Emma's existence as intelligible and
visible as may be"?

What is he talking about?

I

think

he's talking about the idea, the thing we "see" with
respe~t

to character, not exactly the "seeing" in which we

understand what something means,

the sense with which we

"see what it means," but in the visual sense,

that Frye

calls "doodle."
The two elements of subconscious association which
form the basis for lyrical melos and opsis,
respectively, have never been given names.
We may
name them if the terms are thought dignified
enough, babble and doodle.l6
"Doodle" is opsis,
of which Frye says:

the visual aspect of

art~

it is imagism,
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There are thousands of lyrics so intently focused
on visual imagery that they are, as we may say,
set to pictures.
In the emblem an actual picture
appears, and the poet-painter Blake ... engraved
lyrics in the emblem tradition ... The movement
called imagism made a great deal of the pictorial
element in the lyric.l7
Just on the level of style alone,

it is easy to see

the critical difference between using the grammatical
As a group of words, Emma

person and using the image.

Bovary is a point of view; as an image it is possible for
her to have a point of view.

And it is one step from

Emma's having a point of view to our being able to say that
Emma becomes a kind of person.

At the beginning of the

book, when she was just the words "standing there on a day
of thaw" and "she smiled at the springlike warmth," we
could not say that Emma was anything except several words,
a point of view.
Gass has a warning about images, a warning that
should be noted:

"We tend to pay attention to our picture,

and lose sight of the meaning.

The novelist's words are

not notes which he is begging the reader to play, as if
his novel needed something more to be done to it in order
"16
.
.
to 1 eap 1nto
ex1stence.

I

think the novel does have

more done to it than to be simply understood, as Gass is
suggesting, but he is right that readers must avoid
impressionistic criticism.

We must be careful that we

don't image a purple cow from Faulkner's "The Old People;"
the words won't support such an image.
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Now this criticism has come full circle.
grammatical character must again be referred to,
we have arrived at an image.

The
even if

The images are a kind of

representation that are used to talk about grammatical
character.

Returning to the grammatical character,

realizing that grammatical character is words, prevents
such critical comments as Forster's that characters are
people in books and Sidney's that characters are pictures
of virtues and vices.
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CHAPTER III

CHARACTERS IN BOOKS AND PEOPLE IN LIFE
Most often we think of characters in books as though
they were people in life.
chapter,

At the beginning of the first

I suggested that this is easy to do.

But now

that it might be possible to isolate three phases of
character,

it might also be difficult to think of characters

in books as though they were people.

If "characters in

books" means solely grammatical character, means,

in other

words, a group of words on a page, there can be no resemblance between characters in books and people in life.
But, we keep thinking,

there is some kind of resemblance.

Perhaps the relationship is that characters in books, if
they are said to resemble anything,

resemble what the reader

is willing to say about life.
This last,

"what people are willing to say about

life," is implicit in most discussions of character.
Aristotle, when he discusses the universal,

is discussing

what readers would be willing to say about life; he is not
discussing life.
For poetry tells us rather the universals,
history the particulars.
'Universal' means
what kind of thing a certain kind of person
will say or do in accordance with probability
or necessity, which is what poetic composition
aims at, tacking on names afterward; while
'particular' is what Alcibiades did or had done
to him.l
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The phrase "a certain kind of person" implies speech;
implies speech because it implied selection.

it

I think

Aristotle is pointing at a situation like this:

there is

a student named "Hamlet, Prince of Denmark" who is
mourning the death of his father;

he is presented with a

ghost that says his father was murdered by his uncle; the
student could, among other things,

ignore the ghost, take

his uncle to the courts, become very confused, take
revenge, laugh as at a

joke.

This last might not seem

to many of us a possible reaction, because most of us would
not want to say that a student would think the murder of
his father a laughing matter.

If Hamlet, the Prince of

Denmark, chose revenge, he would become the Hamlet of
Shakespeare's play.

In order to see these possibilities,

and in order to see that any particular action is one of
several possible actions, the reader has to say something
about life.
Similarly,

it was noted in the second chapter that

our sense that "I" is somehow alive and sacred comes from
"human passion, one aspect of the human world."

This

means not that "I" means a real passion, but that we
transfer our personal use of "I," the use that I use "I"
when I refez to myself, and myself is somehow more alive
and more sacred than themselves.

But it is the transference

of our individual uses of the word "I" and not the "I" of
any poem, that makes the first person of a poem so special
and alive.
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It seems that there are four possible comparisons
between grammatical characters and what a reader would say
about people in life:
like my brother;

(2)

(1} Hamlet is the character who is
Hamlet is the character who is an

example of some set of generalizations about life;

(3) Ham-

let is a type of person -- a melancholic, a Dane, a man;
(4)

Hamlet is both an individual and some sort of universal,

which is close to, but not quite the same as, Hamlet is a
concept embodied.

This last category is the "concrete

universal," which is the old theory that a thing is simultaneously individual and general.
The first possibility,

2

that Hamlet is like my brother,

is often found in biographical criticism, student literary
papers, and memoirs.

It's quite relaxing criticism and

is often felt to be very enlightening about both Hamlet and
the brother.

But, of course,

this is not criticism; it is

impressionism.
The second possibility, that a character is an example
of some set of generalizations about people in life,

ethical,

or political generalizations, has its two kinds of expressions.
One kind is expressed in novels like Middlemarch and the
other kind is expressed in criticism like that of W.K. Wimsatt in The Verbal Icon.

There is,

in George Eliot's

Middlemarch, a grammatical character that is an example of
a grammatical generalization.
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We are all of us born in moral stupidity,
taking the world as an udder to feed our
supreme selves; Dorothea had early begun to
emerge from that stupidity, but yet it had
been easier to her to imagine how she would
devote herself to Mr. Causabon and be wise
and strong in his strength and wisdom, than
to conceive with that distinctness which is
no longer reflection but feeling -- an idea
wrought back to the directness of sense,
like the solidity of objects -- that he had
an equivalent centre of self, whence the
lights and shadows must always fall with a
certain difference.3
There are three generalizations in this passage from
Middlemarch:

(1)

"We are all of us born in moral stupidity,

taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves;"
(2)

"to conceive with that distinctness which is no longer

reflection but feeling -- an idea wrought back to the
directness of sense,

like the solidity of objects;"

(3)

"an

equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows
must always fall with a certain difference."

Enmeshed in

these generalizations, generalizations that take up 63 of
the 105 words in the paragraph, are "Dorothea" and
"Mr. causabon."
generalization;

"Dorothea" is early linked with the first
she had "early begun to emerge from that

stupidity," "that stupidity" referring to "moral stupidity"
from the first part of the sentence.

Notice, too, that this

paragraph is one sentence.
W. K.

Wimsatt would call this kind of grammatical

character a "concrete illustration."
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The fact is that all concrete illustration has
about it something of the irrelevant.
An
apple falling from a tree illustrates gravity,
but apple and tree are irrelevant to the pure
theory of gravity.
It may be that what
happens in a poem is that the apple and the
4
tree are somehow more than usually relevant.
"Dorothea," as a grammatical person, because Mr.
is subordinate to her,

Causabon

is the group of words from

"Dorothea" to "feeling" and from "that" to "difference."
Most of these words are "moral" words, words that echo
back spatially and antithetically to "We are all of us born
in moral stupidity," etc.

"Dorothea," "Mr. Causabon,"

"her," "she," "his," and "he," then,

are syntactically

linked with the set of moral words, making a grammatical
character who is "born in moral stupidity" and is working
her way to moral feeling,
tight linking,

and who is, because of the

a relevant concrete illustration.

Hamlet as a type of human being, the third kind of
relationship,

is linked critically with the Theophrastan

Character sketch, of which Benjamin Boyce has said:

"Theo-

retically speaking, the Character exists in order to typify
a group;

the portrait,

to separate a man from the group."

5

This statement is an example of one kind of type criticism,
where the critic,

looking at several works in a genre, has

decided what kind of relationship that genre has to real
groups of people;

in fact,

the definition of the "Overburian

Character" in Hollander and Kermode's The Literature of
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England involves this kind of criticism:
An 'Overburian character' existed in order to
represent the deft, tight, single, long
paragraph of characterization of a type of
actual person, rather than a virtue or vice
embodied.6
It would seem that there is a difference between the genre
and its relationship to life.

To demonstrate this I would

like to look at one of the Overburian characters.
An Amorist
Is a man blasted or planet-strooken, and is the
dog that leads blind Cupid; when he is the best
his fashion exceeds the worth of his weight.
He
is never without verses and musk confects, and
sighs to the hazard of his buttons.
His eyes
are all white, either to wear the livery of his
mistress' complexion or to keep Cupid from
hitting the black.
He fights with passion and
loseth much of his blood by his weapons; dreams,
thence his paleness.
His arms are carelessly
used, as if their best use was nothing but
embracements.
He is untrussed, unbuttoned, and
ungartered, not out of carelessness, but care;
his farthest end being but going to bed.
Sometimes he wraps his petition in neatness, but he
goeth not alone; for then he makes some other
quality moralize his affection, and his trimness
is the grace of that grace.
Her favour lifts
him up as the sun moisture; when he disfavours,
unable to hold that happiness, it falls down in
tears.
His fingers are his orators, and he
expresseth much of himself upon some instrument.
He answers not, or not to the purpose, and no
marvel, for he is not at home.
He scotcheth time
with dancing with his mistress, taking up of her
glove, and wearing her feather, he is confined to
her colour, and dares not pass out of the circuit
of her memory.
His imagination is a fool, and it
goeth in a pied coat of red and white.
Shortly
he is translated out of a man into folly; his
imagination is the glass of lust, and himself
the traitor to his own discretion. 7
It does seem necessary, when discussing "An Amorist,"
to talk about people in life the same way Forster found it
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necessary to talk about people in life, what he calls
"flat" and "round" characters.

We find that there is in

his criticism a recognition that there is a grammatical
character of a certain kind that can be called "flat"
and that this ''flat" kind of character is different from
a character that can be called "round."

Although

Forster's remarks about flat and round characters apply
more directly to the discussion of the concrete universal
(a discussion I keep dangling like a critical

carrot~

$0me remarks will be useful here.
Forster complains of Mrs. Micawber that Mrs. Micawber
never says anything except that she will never desert
Mr. Micawber.

He complains about this instead of asserting

i t as a fact about a grammatical character, because he
doesn't think that life presents us with such monomaniacs.
The Amorist is grammatically monomaniacal.

All of

the sentences that contain "he" or "his" also contain some
word about seduction, the same kind of linking talked about
earlier with respect to Dorothea.

There are, besides these

recurrent links, several phrases that are either universals
or are, by grammatical synecdoche,
the scope of the character.

further limitations of

Of the first,

the generaliza-

tions, there is "an amorist," "a man," and a "he" that
refers either to "an amorist" or to "a man," both universals.
The second kind of phrase, a phrase that indicates a
kind of synecdoche on the grammatical level occurs three
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times:

(1)

best~~

"His arms were carelessly used, as if their
nothing but embracements;"

(2)

"He is

untrussed, unbuttoned, and ungartered, not out of careless~·

but care;"

and no marvel,

(3)

He answers not, or not to the purpose,

for he is not at home."

With the negative

phrases, two things are accomplished, some other possibilities are posited, and he is denied them.

He is con-

cretized into amorous language.
It could be said that "An Amorist" is linked
grammatically with "mistress" and "passion" because wolves
in real life, as Boyce says, perfectly conform to one
another.

If we agree that some men are essentially wolfish

that would not be information about the grammatical person.
It might be useful now to look at a character type that is
not so clearly what we would say is characteristic of
some people, one of Nathalie Sarraute's Tropisms.
He was smooth and flat, two level surfaces -his cheeks which he presented first to one
then to the other, and upon which, with their
pursed lips, they pressed a kiss.
They took him and they crunched him, turned
him over and over, stamped on him, rolled,
wallowed on him.
They made him go round and
round, there, and there, and there, they
showed him disquieting painted scenery with
blind doors and windows, towards which he
walked credulously, and against which he
bumped and hurt himself.
They had always known how to possess him entirely,
without a moment's respite, how to devour him to
the last crumb.
They surveyed him, cut him up
into dreadful building blocks, into squares,
traversed him in every direction; sometimes they
let him run, turned him loose, but they brought
him back as soon as he went too far, they took
possession of him again.
He had developed a
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taste for this devouring in childhood -he tendered himself, relished their bittersweet odor, offered himself.
The world in which they had enclosed him, in
which they surrounded him on every side, was
without issue.
Everywhere their frightful
clarity, their blinding light that levelled
everything, did away with all shadows and
asperities.
They were aware of his liking their attacks, his
weakness, so they had no scruples.
They had emptied him entirely and restuffed
him and they showed him everywhere other dolls,
other puppets.
He could not escape them.
He
could only turn politely towards them the two
smooth surfaces of his cheeks, one after the other,
for them to kiss.B
Syntactically, one of the ways we understand that this
character is a type is that the "he" refers only to "he,"
there is no proper name.
smooth and flat,
sketch,

The second clue is that "He was

two level surfaces."

Early on in the

"he" becomes "him," the object, while "they"

becomes the subject.

"They" acts on "him."

The verb

that is the syntactical relationship between "they" and
"him" is, at first "took," then "crunched," then "turned
over."

As we read syntactically building spatial character,

we realize the "they" hurt the "him," so that when "him"
becomes "he," it is not surprising that "he bumped and
hurt himself," or that later "He could not escape them."
Even as a subject, he cannot act at all or cannot act
without being hurt.

The relationship established, then,

between"they" and "him" is that "they" controls and hurts
"him."
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There is a new aspect of "he" added in the third
paragraph;

"He had developed a taste for this devouring

in childhood -- he tendered himself,
bitter-sweet odor, offered himself."

relished their
The new part is

"had developed a taste for this devouring," but this new
part is still within the framework of the relationship
with "they."

"This devouring" is their devouring; of course,

it is "their bitter-sweet odor."
Both sketches,

"An Amorist" and the tropism, end

with lines that imply that "he" does not refer to "man."
The first ends with "Shortly he is translated out of man
into folly;

his imagination is the glass of lust, and himself

the traitor to his own discretion."

The second ends with

"and they showed him everywhere other dolls, other puppets."
This second sketch,

then,

is a type for the same

kinds of grammatical reasons "An Amorist" is a type.

Can

it be said that in either case "he" is a "type of actual
person"?

Of course the question "Is this a type of person?"

is not a question about the grammatical characters, because
words are not people.

This is a question about the image

and about what a reader is willing to say about life.

One

question that could be asked about the second sketch in
order to determine its human type is:
it?

what would we title

Would it be titled, among other possible titles,

Twentieth-Century Man,'' "A Paranoid Man,"
"Hamlet"?

"A Loser,"

"A
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The title of the sketch would depend upon what we are
willing to say about people, and it would depend upon
how we "saw" the character.

I,

for instance, would be

willing to say that most people have felt manipulated,
but that few people have enjoyed it.
then,

that an eerie,

It seems to me,

nameless individual is being

But if one could believe as George Luka~s

described here.

has that "modern ideology

(denies)

the individual,"

9

and that

part of this denial is a feeling of persecution, one could
title this sketch "A Twentieth-Century Man."
It seems,
type,

then,

that there is a genre,

the grammatical

that depends on a reader's view of people and on

his view of the character,

rather than upon the grammatical

character, for its typicality.
one step further,

If I

can take the argument

it would seem that if one would say that

"he" in Saurraute's sketch is typical of a kind of
person,

the sketch itself would be what one would say

about a kind of person.
speaks for me."

One could say,

then,

"The sketch

It is then that the grammatical person

would be what one would have said about a kind of person,
but it cannot itself be a kind of person.
The concrete universal,

the fourth way of talking

about the relationship between characters in books and
people in life,

is said to be a grammatical character that

is at once individual and general.

So far it has been

suggested that there is a grammatical character that is on
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the grammatical level, both individual and an example of
some sort of generalization; Dorothea Brooks in Middlemarch
was used as an example of this type of character.
And it was seen that there is the grammatical type
that might be considered universal if one were to agree
that what is written is the essence of some people.
The concrete universal seems to be a category that puts
together the specific of "Dorothea" with the notion that
"Dorothea," and her surrounding noun and verb clusters is
what one would say is the essence of some people.
This mingling seems clear in W.

K. Wimsatt's definition

of the concrete universal.
A literary work of art is a complex of detail
(an artifact, if we may be allowed that metaphor
for what is only a verbal object), a composition
so complicated of human values that its interpretation is dictated by the understanding of it,
and so complicated as to seem in the higheiO
degree individual -- a concrete universal.
His definition places "human values" inside a work of art,
and a work is so full of these human values that the work's
interpretation is dictated by the understanding of "it" and
an understanding of it seems to be an understanding of human
values.

This seems to be quite like what I said earlier

about grammatical types, that, as far as a reader agrees
that what is written is the dominant trait of some people,
the grammatical type can be said to be what one would say
is a type of actual person.
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The characteristic that seems to distinguish the
grammatical type from the concrete character for Wimsatt
is the word "complicated."

It was seen earlier that

"An Amorist" is not complicated; grammatical type seems
to center around one or two words.
Falstaff or such a character of self-conscious
'infinite variety' as Cleopatra are concrete
universals because they have no class names,
only their own proper ones, yet are structures
of such precise variety and centrality that
each demands a special interpretation in the
realm of human values. 1 1
It seems,

then,

that for Wimsatt,

the concrete universal

is the same thing as Forster's "round character."
The notion that a grammatical character is both
individual and universal could simply be another kind of
type criticism where we could say,

for instance,

that

Hamlet is a kind of person, perhaps a manic-depressive,
where clearly the idea of his type is in our minds not in
the play.

It also seems possible,

some characters,

however, to say that

even some very simple characters, are

simultaneously individual and universal.

"Julia," in

Hericks's "Upon Julia's Clothes," is one character that
might be a concrete universal in this sense.
Whenas in silks my Julia goes,
Then, then, methinks, how sweetly flows
That liquefaction of her clothes.
Next, when I cast mine eyes and see
That brave vibration each way free,
Oh, how that glittering taketh me!l2
As a grammatical person,

"Julia" is both "Julia" and "her
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clothes."

Julia and her clothes are individual in this

poem because they do not extend beyond the limits of
the poem "Upon Julia•s Clothes."

In other words, they

are concrete because they are grammatical character; they
are only "themselves."

But in this sense,

too, the gram-

matical character type is also concrete and therefore
individual.
There is a way, though, that we can talk about a
concrete universal.

An individual proper name is one

way of making a character both individual and universal.
This simultaneity lies in our understanding of the name:
The name of a human being designates him or her
as both an individual and as a person; for this
reason the name has male or female gender.
But
the first and second personal pronouns, which we
use when addressing each other as persons have
no gender.
The third person pronoun has gender and
is therefore, strictly speaking, impersonal.
It is
grammatically convenient, when speaking to say
He or She, but if, when we do, we think of them
as He or She, not as John and Sheila, then we are
thinkinj of them, not as persons, but as individuals.1
It can be said that "Julia," the grammatical character,
is,

in the image, the woman who wore clothes in the poem

"Upon Julia•s Clothes;" Julia is both "Julia" the person
who, and "her," the woman who.

There is no general state-

ment in the poem of which "Julia" is the example;

"Julia"

is a concrete who is, by the making of the mental recreation
and the understanding of the language, a universal.
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The concrete universal is, as I

suggested earlier,

like, but not quite the same as, a virtue of a vice
embodied.
in a name.

In a number of cases the difference is simply
The Faerie Queene is a place in which to find

several examples of virtues and vices embodied.
And greedy Avarice by him d~d ride
Upon a camel loaden all with gold;
Two iron coffers hung on either side,
With precious metal full as they might hold;
And in his lap an heap of gold he told;
For of his wicked pelf his god he made,
And unto hell himself for money sold.
Accure'd usury was all his trade,
14
And right and wrong alike in equal balance weighed.
The name is "Avarice."

"His lap" is the body; by rhetorical

synecdoche "And right and wrong alike in equal balance
With the aid of the

weighed" is the syntactical mind.
image,

"him did ride" gives Avarice more body, as do

"he told" and "his trade."

All these phrases cluster

around the name Avarice, a vice.
is a grammatical type.

This kind of monomaniac

Because of the name "Avarice,"

he is called a vice embodied.

If his name had been

"Alfred," for instance, he would be called a grammatical
type, a "flat character."

But, he is also a concrete

universal in the sense that he is a

single uncopied grammati-

cal type, and in the sense that he, the image, acts as we
would say an avaricious person would.
It seems,

then, that there are two basic relationships

between characters and people in life.

One is whether or

not the grammatical character agrees with what we would
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say about people and the other is whether or not the
image, the image in the sense of a character's point of
view or actions or thoughts, agrees with what we would
say about people.

Of the first,

grammatical character type,

we can say that a

because it is a character

based upon only one or two concepts,

is a grammatical

character that is typical of some people if we agree with
what is written.

Percy Lubbock's discussion of Emma

Bovary is an example of criticism based upon the image,
because the criticism discusses Emma's point of view and
replaces the grammatical person with the image as the
fact of the character, but it is possible, as in the
discussion of "On Julia's Clothes," to combine the two
basic relationships in the "concrete universal," to say
that although the grammatical character is unique,
also typical of some people.

it is
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION

This paper was an attempt to describe what happens
when we as readers compare literary characters with people.
Literary character is a process that includes three separate
elements:

(1)

syntactical character,

the words that delimit

character in the order in which they occur on the printed
page;

(2)

spatial character,

syntactical character patterned.

These two elements together are called "grammatical characters";

(3)

the image, a mental recreation of the syntactical

and spatial characters.

These elements can be isolated,

but they are so intimately connected while we read that we
are rarely conscious of their individual roles, and to
further complicate the critical matter, we tend in our
discussions of character to rely on the old relationship
between characters and people.
The isolation of these three elements,

an isolation

that seems important to discussions of character, becomes
a confusing process when critics compare literary characters
to people.

E. M. Forster and Sir Philip Sidney, for

instance, by calling characters "people in books"
"images of virtues and vices,"

2

1

and

make it difficult to dis-

tinguish between grammatical character and the image,
making it difficult as well to discuss HCE from Finnegans

so
Wake, Mrs. Malaprop,

or an omniscient narrator.

William Gass's reaction to these mimetic views is
that character is "{1)

a noise,

complex system of ideas,

(4)

(2)

a proper name,

( 7)

a

a controlling conception,

{5) an instrument of verbal organization,
mode of referring,

{3)

(6)

a pretended

a source of verbal energy."

3

Gass's objective view, which confines us to the grammatical
character, makes discussions of characters like Emma
Bovary or Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Ramsay dead and lifeless.

4

The isolation of the three elements of character does
not eliminate the relationship between characters in books
and people;

it just clarifies it.

It is now possible to

recognize that there are two distinct comparisons between
character and people.

We can compare the words we might

say about people to the words with which a book presents
character;

they may be grammatically alike.

And we can

compare the image element of character with what we might
imagine of people.

The image, of course, is more directly

related to what we make of people than is the grammatical
character.

This is easily seen in criticism -- Gass's

criticism, which leaves out the image,

is more dead and

lifeless than Sidney's, which leaves in the image.
as we have seen,

But,

it is confusing to make the book alive by

saying in effect that what we imagine is the same sort of
thing as what we say -- that characters are "people in
books."

Grammatical character is like what we would

~
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about people in life;

the image is like what we would

imagine about people.
Finally from the separation of character into three
elements and from the recognition that the grammatical
character and the image approach in different ways

a

reader's perceptions of people, comes a clearer understanding of the four different ways of comparing characters in
books with what a reader is willing to say or to imagine
that people are like.
We can now say that characters compare with people
in these four ways:

(1)

the grammatical character or the

image is like someone a reader knows.
criticism, but impressionism;

(2)

This is not precisely

a grammatical character

is an example of some grammatical generalization about
life;

(3)

a character is a type of person, which means that

a grammatical character, usually a "flat character," is
like what a reader would say is the dominant characteristic
of some people.

The image can also be used here to say

things like "this character's attitude toward food is like
some people's attitude toward food";

(4)

a character is a

concrete universal, which means that a character is
simultaneously individual and typical of some people.
This is the most complex of comparisons.
character is always individual;
words.

Grammatical

it is a unique set of

If this set is "complicated" of several basic

concepts, it can be considered to be like what a reader
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would say is typical of some people.

And a grammatical

character can be considered a concrete universal if its
name is seen as simultaneously individual and general,
since a name is both one's personal name and is indicative
of sex and sometimes of class.
here too,

to say,

for example,

The image can be used
that a character's change

in attitude is like a change in attitude we have named
from life.

This criticism, then,

a criticism based on the

separation of our experiences of character into three
separate elements, allows us to account for the traditional
comparisons between characters and people, at the same
time allowing us to discuss both the words and the images
without confusing the two in a labyrinth of metaphors.
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FOOTNOTES TO CONCLUSION
1

Forster, p.

47.

2 Sl.. d ney, C3.
3 Gass, p.
4

36.

He does suggest that there is a kind of spurious
image:
"from ~given body of fictional text, nothing
necessarily follows, and anything may (p. 36). But it goes
quickly, because images become, in his argument, simply
free associative.
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